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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, ; 
Plaintiff and Respondent,] 
vs. 
WILFORD L. McCULLOUGH, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Case No. 900100 CA 
Priority 2.0 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE PAUL GRANT PRESIDING. 
INTRODUCTION 
The jurisdiction of the Court, nature of the proceeding, 
issues, statement of the case, and statement of facts are set 
forth in Appellant's opening Brief at pages 1 through 4. 
Appellant takes this opportunity to respond to one of the 
"facts" and to the arguments set forth in Points I and II of 
Respondent's Brief. Appellant's position is further 
strengthened by the recent decision of State v. Talbot, 134 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) published subsequent 
to the filing of Appellant's brief. 
1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent cites and relies heavily on two Salt Lake City 
ordinances for the proposition that the officer stopped the 
Appellant for violating them. Nowhere in the transcript has 
the officer testified he relied on a violation of the 
ordinances to stop Appellant in this case nor did he state 
that he stopped Appellant on the basis of any other traffic 
violation. Officers are not allowed to make traffic stops to 
investigate "hunches" about criminal activity under the guise 
of a pretextual traffic violation. 
The officer did not articulate a reasonable basis for 
stopping the Appellant. As objective facts were not 
articulated, the officer's suspicion or mere hunch did not 
justify the subsequent stop. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OFFICER WILLIAMS DID NOT STATE THAT HE STOPPED 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE BECAUSE HE BELIEVED A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF'S 
RELIANCE ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION IS MISPLACED. 
The plaintiff asserts in its brief that the officer had 
"probable cause" to believe a violation had occurred. This 
conclusory statement is unsupported by the trial transcript, 
ignores the clear testimony of Officer Williams, and ignores 
the specific Findings of Fact by the trial court, to-wit: 
2 
"7. Based solely on the vehicle in question not proceeding 
through the intersection for thirty (30) seconds, Officer 
Williams stopped the vehicle in question." 
The prosecution cites pages 6, 10 and 11 of the trial 
transcript in an attempt to bootstrap the testimony of the 
arresting officer to support counsel's conclusion that a 
traffic violation was the basis for the stop of defendant's 
vehicle. To the contrary, Page 6 contains no testimony by 
Officer Williams that he stopped the defendant because he 
thought a traffic violation had occurred. Pages 10 and 11 of 
the trial transcript contain the the following dialogues 
Mr. Cook: Let's back up to having seen him stopped 
at the light without moving. Have you 
ever stopped anybody for this type of 
violation before? 
Officer: Yes, I have. 
*•• 
Mr. Cook: To the best of your knowledge, is this a 
violation of the law, not to proceed through a 
green light? 
Officer: Yes, it is. 
Mr. Cook: Have you ever stopped anybody for such a 
violation before? 
Officer: Yes, I have. 
Mr. Cook: Okay, based on your observation of the 
defendant waiting at that light, did you 
believe that he may have been impaired by the 
time—based on the time he took to go through 
the light? 
3 
Officer: Yes, I did. 
Nowhere in the above portions of the transcript nor in 
any remaining portions of the transcript does the officer 
testify that he stopped the defendant in this case because 
defendant had committed a traffic violation by remaining at 
the light for 30 seconds after it turned green. 
As shown above, the officer never stated that he was 
stopping the defendant in this case for a traffic violation. 
In State v. Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), this Court addressed a factual situation in which the 
defendant was stopped because he had avoided a roadblock. On 
appeal, the State asserted, as a basis for stopping Talbot's 
vehicle, that the defendant had committed several traffic 
violations. This Court would not permit retroactive 
justification for the stop because "[i]t is inconsequential 
that the officers could have stopped the vehicle for one or 
more traffic violations where in fact the stop was for other 
reasons." _Id. at 17. 
The prosecution concludes the defendant in this case was 
stopped on the basis of a technical traffic violation but this 
conclusion is unsupported by the transcript. In fact, the 
officer had a "hunch" and stopped the defendant's vehicle 
because he believed the defendant was impaired. Here, as in 
4 
Talbot, the prosecution should not be allowed to justify this 
stop under the retroactive premise that the officer could 
have stopped defendant's vehicle for traffic violations the 
prosecution believes occurred prior to the stop. 
II. 
OFFICER WILLIAMS DID NOT ARTICULATE A REASONABLE BASIS 
FOR STOPPING DEFENDANT. 
Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants is a 
Fourth Amendment seizure regardless of the reason for the 
stop. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App, 1988). A seizure is 
ordinarily justified only if the stop was incident to a 
traffic offense or based at least upon a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants had or were 
about to commit a crime. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975. 
An officer must articulate specific objective facts which 
indicate the existence of criminal activity in order to have a 
reasonable basis for stopping a vehicle. Talbot, 134 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 17. If the officer is unable to articulate the 
facts and inferences leading to his suspicion, "the suspicion 
is classified as being a mere hunch and will not justify the 
subsequent stop." Ld. (citing State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ) . 
Officer Williams did not articulate any objective facts 
5 
that would indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. The officer testified that the car paused for 30 
seconds after the light turned green; he then stated that the 
car proceeded through the light. (Trial transcript at 6, 
hereinafter T.6). The next question posed by the prosecution 
was, "What action did you take?" (T.6). Without any 
explanation regarding objective facts or reasonable 
suspicions, the officer testified that he stopped the vehicle 
and called on the radio that he would be stopping the vehicle. 
(T.6 and 7). 
The prosecution did not sustain its burden of 
establishing that the officer had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to justify the stop. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully 
requests this Court reverse the Trial Court's denial of 
defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence pursuant to a traffic 
stop. Evidence obtained subsequent to the illegal stop should 
be suppressed and the case remanded to the Trial Court for 
6 
withdrawal of defendant's conditional plea and trial on the 
merits. 
DATED this pf day of Q ^_ 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Phillip W. Dyer $ 
Pamela C. Urry 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MI:b:mccullou•rep/APP 
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ADDENDUM 
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(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook) 
A. West patrol division. 
Q. Fine. Was your attention directed toward a 
Chevy truck, 19 7 3, blue over white? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. What first attracted your attention to that 
vehicle? 
A. I don't — I pulled up next to it, I believe 
it was 200 West and 900 South, and — 
Q. And --
A. — the light — 
Q. — what color was the light at that time? 
A. The light was red at that time. 
Q. Okay. Did the light change to green? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. Okay. What did the other car do when the light 
changed to green? 
A. It did not move. 
Q. Can you estimate approximately how long it 
didn't move at the green light? 
A. I estimated 30 seconds. 
Q. Did the vehicle then go through the light? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. What action then did you take? 
A. I stopped the vehicle. Got behind it and 
called on the radio that I would be stopping the 
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook) 
vehicle. Turned on my lightsf the overhead lights, and 
pulled the vehicle over. 
Q. You were then in a squad car at this time? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you approach the driver of the vehicle? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you notice anything unusual about this 
individual's condition when you approached him? 
Specifically, did you notice any odor of alcoholic 
beverage about this person? 
A. I noticed a very strong odor of alcohol as I 
approached the driver's door. 
Q. Did you notice his — or his eyes? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What can you tell us about th€* condition of 
his eyes? 
A. They were bloodshot. 
Q. 
movements 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
time? 
A. 
Did you notice anything unusual about his 
when he got out of *the car? 
Yeah. 
What did you notice? 
He was very unstable. 
Did you have a conversation with him at this 
Yes, I did. 
7 
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook) 
Q. Is he here in the courtroom? 
A. Yes, he is. 
Q. Would you please indicate where? 
A. In the blue suit, red tie. 
Q. And what color shirt? 
A. Light blue. 
MR. COOK: May the record reflect 
identification, your Honor? 
THE COURT: It is so indicated. 
Q. Let's back up to having seen him stopped at the 
light without moving. Have you ever stopped anybody for 
this type of violation before? 
A. Yes, I have. 
MR. DYER: Objection, your Honor. I don't 
believe that there's been any testimony that there was a 
violation. 
MR. COOK: Okay. 
MR. DYER: (Inaudible). 
Q. To the best of your knowledge — 
MR. COOK: I'll rephrase, your Honor. 
Q. To the best of your knowledge, is this a 
violation of the law, not to proceed through a green 
light? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Have you ever stopped anybody for such a 
10 
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer) 
violation before? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Okay. Based on your observation of the 
defendant waiting at that light, did you believe that he 
may have been impaired by the time — based on 
the time that he took to go through the light? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Nothing further of the witness, your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DYER: 
Q. Officer, is it your testimony then, as I 
understand it, that the basis for your investigation was 
the length of time that the vehicle was stopped at the 
intersection; is that correct? 
A. That's what initiated the investigation, 
that's not the basis of the rest of the investigation. 
Q. Okay, I'm with you. But that's the -- that 
is the basis upon which you decided to stop 
Mr. McCullough's vehicle, correct? There was -- you 
didn't base it on any sort of a driving pattern or any 
other conduct that you observed? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And also is your testimony, if I'm not 
correct, that you said it is a violation of law to not 
11 
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
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